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Situated Representations and
Ad Hoc Concepts1
Jérôme Dokic
Introduction
Situation theorists such as Jon Barwise, John Etchemendy, and (at one time)
John Perry have advanced the hypothesis that linguistic and mental repres-
entations are ‘situated’ in the sense that they are true or false only relative to
partial situations. François Recanati has done an important task in reviving
and in many respects deepening situation theory. In this chapter, I would
like to explore some aspects of Recanati’s own account. I shall focus on situ-
ated mental representations, and stress the connection between them and
ad hoc or temporary concepts. First, I introduce the notion of unarticulated
constituent, due to John Perry. I suggest that the question of whether there
really are such constituents should be distinguished into two issues, one
concerning language and the other concerning thought (Section 10.1). Then
I formulate a dilemma that any friend of cognitive unarticulated constituents
must face: alleged unarticulated constituents seem to be either articulated
or non-constituents after all (Section 10.2). The dilemma is strengthened
by the fact that unarticulated constituents cannot be inferentially relevant
(Section 10.3). In order to show, hopefully, that the dilemma can be escaped
from, I give two illustrations of what I take to be genuine unarticulated
constituents. In the first, thoughts like It’s raining and It’s over are implicitly
related to spatiotemporal situations via practical capacities for keeping track
of particular places or times (Section 10.4). In the second, more tentative
illustration, the relevant situations are not given, but stipulated, as with
In Constance, it’s raining (Section 10.5). In the last section, I argue that the
notion of situation which emerges from the previous discussion is rather
different from the one used by Recanati himself.
10.1 Unarticulated constituents: language and thought
Consider the following sentences (Perry 2001: 44):
(1) It is raining
(2) They are serving drinks at the local bar
203
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Many utterances of (1) are true if and only if it is raining at a particular
place, typically where the speaker is. Similarly, many utterances of (2) are true
if and only if the people referred to by ‘they’ are serving drinks at a particular
bar, typically located in the speaker’s neighbourhood. Nevertheless, there is
no item in the sentence (1) that designates the place where it is raining, just
as there is no item in (2) that designates the location relative to which the
bar is described as local.
In Perry’s terminology, the relevant places are unarticulated constituents of
the propositions expressed by utterances of (1) and (2). For instance, the
place where it is raining ‘is a constituent, because, since rain occurs at a time
in a place, there is no truth-evaluable proposition unless a place is supplied.
It is unarticulated, because there is no morpheme that designates the place’
(2001: 45). The idea is that the interpreter has to look to the context after
she has identified all the words and their meanings in the sentence; the
context is used in a ‘content-supplemental’ way. In this respect, (1) and (2)
differ from the explicitly indexical sentences ‘It is raining here’ and ‘They
are serving drinks at the bar in this neighbourhood’, which articulate the
relevant places.
It is worth distinguishing here two issues that are prima facie independent,
although Perry himself often has both in mind. The first issue is about
language, whereas the second is about thought.2 At the level of language,
the relevant question is whether what is literally said by an utterance of ‘It’s
raining’ (the ‘official’ proposition expressed by the sentence in context) can
involve an implicit reference to a particular place even though there is no
item, context-sensitive or not, corresponding to it in the syntactic or sub-
syntactic structure of the sentence uttered. In other words, can one literally
say that it is raining at a particular place by using only a one-place predicate
‘rain’ true of times? If the answer is ‘yes’, the place is a semantic unarticulated
constituent of the linguistic representation ‘It is raining’. Some authors, like
Stanley (2000, 2002), doubt that there are unarticulated constituents in this
sense, and defend the view that all alleged unarticulated constituents turn
out to be articulated at a deeper level of syntactic structure or logical form.
The issue at the level of thought, as I see it, is whether what is thought in
an utterance of ‘It is raining’ can involve an implicit reference to a particular
place even though no constituent of the thought designates it. Let us say that
the constituents of thoughts are concepts or modes of presentation of various
objects and properties.3 When a subject thinks It’s raining,4 can her thought
in some sense concern a particular place while she does not grasp any mode
of presentation of that place? Can she just deploy in thought the one-place
concept rain, saturated by a mode of presentation of the present time?5 If
the answer to these questions is ‘yes’, the place is a cognitive unarticulated
constituent of the thought It’s raining.
Interestingly, the two issues might be independent. Even if Stanley is right
and there is no English predicate ‘rain’ true of times only, some thoughts
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naturally expressed by ‘It’s raining’ might involve the one-place concept rain.
Conversely, if Stanley is wrong, as Recanati has recently argued (2002), and
the sentence ‘It’s raining’ can involve a one-place predicate true of times, it is
still possible that the thought naturally expressed by this sentence involves
a mode of presentation of a particular place.
Consider Stanley’s main argument to the effect that all constituents are
articulated in some sense. This is the Argument from Binding. Stanley claims
that if there are unarticulated constituents, they cannot vary with the values
introduced by operators in the sentence uttered. Now, it is possible to prefix
‘It’s raining’ with a spatial operator, like in ‘Everywhere I go, it’s raining’. In
the last sentence, ‘rain’ is supposedly a two-place predicate, for the operator
must bind a variable for a place. However (the argument goes on), in the
original sentence as well, ‘rain’ is a two-place predicate, for there seems to be
only one predicate ‘rain’ in English. Thus, an utterance of ‘It’s raining’ does
not introduce any unarticulated spatial constituent; the place is articulated,
at least in the form of a variable.6
I think that Stanley’s argument is best viewed against the background
assumption that language is modular, at least to some extent. The modu-
larity of language implies that predicates are lexically given independently
of the cognitive context. Now I want to contrast linguistic modularity with
cognitive flexibility. One of the most interesting claims of recent cognitive
science is that concepts are very often constructed ‘on the fly’, depending on
the current cognitive task. In addition to the ‘stable’ concepts that might be
encoded by words, there are ad hoc or occasional concepts, namely temporary
constructions in working memory. These cognitive constructions have been
postulated in many areas of cognition (Sperber and Wilson 1998; Barsalou
1999; Carston 2002; Prinz 2002). Here is a recent statement of the context-
sensitivity of concepts:
[W]e all have countless DOG concepts    The way one represents a dog
depends on whether one is thinking about the artic tundra or Central
Park. The way one represents an elephant depends on whether one is at
a circus, in a zoo, or on a safari. (Prinz 2002: 152–3)
If we take the idea of ad hoc concepts seriously (as I think we should), there
are many concepts of rain varying with the cognitive context. Thus, even
if the thought Everywhere I go, it’s raining involves a concept of rain which
demands a spatial mode of presentation, the simpler thought It’s raining
might well involve, in some contexts, a spatially neutral conception of rain.
Without exaggerating the gap between language and thought, we should
be open to the possibility that a truth-conditionally relevant parameter is
unarticulated at the semantic level while being articulated at the cognitive
level, and vice versa. Table 10.1 summarizes the four possible cases.
In case (a), the relevant constituent is articulated both at the level of
the sentence and at the level of thought. This case covers utterances of ‘It
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Table 10.1
a b c d
Level of the sentence
(linguistic meaning)
+ − + −
Level of thought (conceptual
content)
+ + − −
is raining here’ and ‘It is raining in Paris’ when the place which is expli-
citly referred to is also singled out in thought. The existence of case (b) is
more controversial. If we accept Recanati (2002)’s analysis of ‘It’s raining’,
according to which it need not introduce anything more sophisticated than
a one-place predicate ‘rain’, we can imagine a scenario in which the subject
uses this sentence but articulates the place in her thought. This may happen
if the place has been explicitly introduced earlier in the conversation, so that
it is now obvious to the speaker and the hearer which place is in question.
As an example of case (c), take a subject who uses a two-place predicate
‘rain’ true of times and places, but does not bother articulating the place
in thought, perhaps because the current cognitive task does not require it.
Finally, in case (d), a truth-conditionally relevant constituent is unarticu-
lated both at the level of sentence and at the level of thought.
10.2 A dilemma
Still, the claim that there are cognitive unarticulated constituents is contro-
versial. There is a fundamental dilemma that any friend of such constituents
has to face. Either the alleged unarticulated constituent is cognitively relevant,
or it is not. In the former case, it can be a constituent of what is represented,
but it seems to be articulated in the subject’s cognitive life after all. So it
looks as if the alleged unarticulated parameter must be cognitively irrelevant.
However, in this case, it can no longer be considered a constituent of what is
represented, for there is in principle a more accurate interpretation available.
Perry (2001: 46–7) draws a distinction among cases where he says there
is an unarticulated constituent, between those where ‘there is nothing
insightful or innovative about articulating it’, and those where a conceptual
innovation is called for. The former cases include ‘It is raining’ and ‘They
are serving drinks at the local bar’, which can easily be transformed into,
say, ‘It is raining in Paris’ and ‘They are serving drinks at the bar in this
neighbourhood’. The first horn of the dilemma is doing its work here: since
we all know that rain is a spatially located phenomenon and that something
counts as local only relative to some reference location, the sense in which
the thoughts expressed by these utterances are not fully articulated is at best
unexplained.
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In the other cases, the relevant constituent cannot easily be articulated
save by using some general purpose phrase like ‘relative to’ or ‘according
to’. However (and this is the second horn of the dilemma), I would say that
at least some of these cases really do not involve unarticulated constituents.
Consider the following examples, all discussed by Perry:
(1) These two flashes of light were simultaneous, as thought by someone
who has no idea of the theory of relativity.
(2) It’s two o’clock, as thought by a young child who does not yet have
the concept of a time-zone.
(3) It’s raining, as thought by a Z-lander. (Perry 1993)
According to the theory of relativity, simultaneity has three argument
roles: two events are simultaneous relative to an inertial frame. However,
the folk notion of simultaneity does not involve any concept or mode of
presentation of a frame. Does it follow that the frame is a cognitive unar-
ticulated constituent? The answer depends on whether it is plausible to say
that what is thought is made true, when it is true, by facts involving the
triadic relation of simultaneity which the theory of relativity talks about.
This is not very plausible for ordinary thinkers who have never heard of this
theory. From the perspective of the theory of relativity, these thinkers have
a naïve and confused view of physical reality. So, strictly speaking, a thought
like (1) does not record an instance of physical simultaneity, but (perhaps)
an experienced temporal coincidence. Of course, an educated semanticist
can give (1) truth-conditions that are relative to an inertial frame. This inter-
pretation is literally incorrect, but harmless if the validity of the thinkers’
inferences and the success of their actions do not hinge on the identity
of the underlying frame. In fact, they do not move, either in reality or in
imagination, between frames.
Similarly, what is thought by the child does not have a particular time-
zone as a cognitive constituent. When she eventually masters the concept
of a time-zone, she can then reinterpret her earlier thoughts about the time
as being true or false relative to a particular time-zone. Still, her temporal
thinking before the conceptual change showed no sensitivity to time-zones,
and belonged to a more primitive way of responding to the world.
Consider finally the third case. Perry (1993) imagines a community of
primitive thinkers, called ‘Z-landers’, who do not travel and do not have the
conception of a particular region as opposed to another. In particular, they
always conceive of rain as a monadic property of times. For them, it just
rains or not (at a given time). Z-landers’ judgements about meteorological
phenomena have a kind of primitiveness analogous to that of our ordinary
judgements about simultaneity. We just don’t have the same official onto-
logy of rain. Their concept rain is not a concept of particular spatial regions.
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So their thoughts It’s raining do not embody a conception of objective, re-
identifiable places at all, but belong to a feature-placing mode of thinking
in Strawson’s (1959) sense.
Thus, pace Perry and Recanati, the examples (1)–(3) do not introduce unar-
ticulated constituents because in each case there is a better interpretation
which makes the relevant utterances and thoughts completely articulated
after all, although expressive of a more primitive ontology.
10.3 Inferential roles
The dilemma just presented can be strengthened by considering the connec-
tion between thought and inference. A thought explicitly represents some-
thing if and only if it contains a concept or mode of presentation of that
thing. A thought is composed of as many concepts as it has inferentially
relevant aspects (Crane, 1992). When something is explicitly represented,
there will be inferences hinging on the identity of what is represented. For
instance, the thought Claire is upset has at least two constituents (Claire and
is upset) because it can participate in formal inferences such as the following,
where these constituents figure separately in other thoughts:7
(1) Claire is upset. Claire is my sister. So my sister is upset.
One can accept that there is an internal relation between thought and
inference even if one does not believe that inferential role can be charac-
terized independently of conceptual content. Perhaps inferential role flows
from a more basic account of conceptual content. The point is rather that
whatever notion is fundamental (perhaps both are), a thought is individu-
ated by its role in inferences hinging on its conceptual constituents.
Conversely, if there are unarticulated constituents, they cannot be infer-
entially relevant. For instance, if the thought It’s raining is only implicitly
related to a particular place, it cannot participate in inferences hinging on
the identity of that place. This may cast doubt on the existence of unarticu-
lated constituents. How can there be room for a thought to have constituents
which cannot play any role as middle terms in inferences?
One can specify in advance the general form that a convincing answer
to this question should have. The propositional content of a particular
mental representation is determined, at least partly, by the way it is used or
‘consumed’ by the cognitive system (Millikan 1993). One way of using the
representation is in inferences. One can infer the representation from other
representations, and one can infer other representations from it. However,
the representation’s inferential role, which determines the inferences in
which it can participate, does not exhaust the absolute proposition expressed
(its ‘official’ content) if there are other ways of using it that are semantic-
ally relevant too.8 In what follows, I shall give two illustrations of how this
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can arise. In the first illustration, representations are anchored to situations
via practical capacities for keeping track of times and places. In the second
illustration, the situation is explicitly represented, but situated representa-
tions are still used in chains of thoughts. In both cases, some aspects of the
representations’ inferential roles are silenced, generating ad hoc concepts.
10.4 Placing features
Perry insightfully points out that ‘there is a little of the Z-lander in the most
well-travelled of us’ (1993: 216). In other words, there are circumstances in
which I think and act as if I were a Z-lander: I look out the window, judge
It’s raining, want to stay dry, believe that if I deploy my umbrella over my
head, I will stay dry, and eventually deploy my umbrella. In this mode of
practical reasoning, the question of which particular place is in question is
never raised. The inferences involving the thought It’s raining do not hinge
on the identity of a particular place. This kind of cognitive task does not
involve anything more sophisticated than a one-place concept of rain, true
of times.
Similar considerations apply to the temporal counterparts of thoughts like
It’s raining. As Prior (1976) emphasized, there are contexts in which the
thought It’s over, formed in referring to some painful event I have just gone
through, immediately modifies my action tendencies and makes me feel
relief. In these contexts, It’s over is a temporary construction which does not
involve a temporal mode of presentation.
Thoughts like It’s raining and It’s over belong to a mode of perceiving,
thinking and acting on the world which is relatively neutral from a spati-
otemporal point of view. In that mode, I can acquire information that
some property is instantiated, but I cannot acquire the information that it
is instantiated in my perceptual field considered as a particular place among
others. In order to make sense of the latter information, I have to impose
on my perception a cognitive map that contrasts the local place with other
places, not currently perceived. Similarly, I can acquire perceptual inform-
ation that some event is completed, but I cannot acquire the information
that it happened at a particular time. In order to make sense of the latter
information, I normally invoke a linear conception of time that contrasts
the present time with other times. The uses of a cognitive map and a linear
conception of time involve more sophisticated thoughts like It’s raining here
and It’s over now, which are explicitly about particular places or times.9
The fact that I use representations such as It’s raining and It’s over does
not mean that I adhere to Z-landers’ ontology of rain, or that I indulge in a
doubtful temporal ontology in which being over is an absolute property of
events. My use of such representations is restricted to particular situations,
in which the source of perception is roughly the same as the target of action.
For instance, I would not go into the described inferential transitions if
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I believed that the place of perception has become significantly different
from the place of action. In contrast, Z-landers would make the same judge-
ments if they were nomads, unknowingly changing places. Similarly, even
though my thought It’s over is not explicitly about the present time, the fact
is that I use it only for an instant. In particular, it is never stored in that
form in long-term memory for later use.
In other words, two dimensions can be distinguished in our use of the
relevant representations. On the one hand, they have inferential roles char-
acteristic of a feature-placing (spatial or temporal) mode of thinking. On
the other hand, these roles are constrained by the subject to apply in
specific spatiotemporal contexts. My suggestion is that the thoughts’ ‘offi-
cial’ contents are jointly determined by both dimensions, so that It’s raining
is true if and only if it is raining at a particular place, and It’s over is true if
and only if it is over at a particular time.
It is plausible that these representations are derived from more stable ones
by cancelling some cognitive features of the latter. For instance, the concept
RAIN1, true of times only, might be derived from the stable concept RAIN2,
true of times and places, by silencing our ability to distinguish one rain event
from another (at a given time), leaving only our ability to distinguish rain
from non-rain. What makes the relevant representations ad hoc, though, is
that they are temporary constructions, opportunistically used only as long as
a particular cognitive task is carried out.
10.5 Situating inferences
On the foregoing account of Perry-like scenarios, the relevant thoughts are
anchored to spatio-temporal situations via practical capacities for keeping
track of the subject’s own movements in space or the passage of time.
However, there are more sophisticated cases in which the situation is not
given but stipulated. Consider the complex thought At Lake Constance, it’s
raining. On the traditional analysis, the concept rain calls for a spatial mode of
presentation, which here determines Lake Constance. Following Karl Bühler,
Recanati argues on the contrary that when one entertains a representation
like ‘At Lake Constance, it’s raining’, ‘one simulatively entertains a repres-
entation decoupled from the egocentric situation’ (2000: 162) in such a
way that Lake Constance is ‘presentified through an act of the imagina-
tion’ (2000: §6.5). So within the context of simulation, only a spatially neutral
conceptof rain is involved–thesameas intheself-standingthought It’s raining.
The difference between the two analyses is not obvious when a single
representation is concerned. However, the merit of the second analysis
emerges when we turn to more complex cases. Consider the following chain
of thoughts:10
(1) I’ve just had news from my friend in Constance. It’s raining heavily, so the
streets are slippery. Everybody has to drive very carefully.
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The first thought in the chain explicitly introduces the anchor to which
the rest of the reasoning is attached. The thoughts It’s raining heavily, The
streets are slippery and Everybody has to drive very carefully are then all true
relative to Constance. Intuitively, it would be redundant, from a cognitive
point of view, to articulate the reference to Constance at each step of the
inference process, as in (2):
(2) It’s raining heavily in Constance, so the streets of Constance are slippery.
Everybody in Constance has to drive very carefully.
The question is how to spell out this intuitive argument in favour of the
existence of situated reasoning such as (1).
Consider first the thought It’s raining heavily as it occurs in (1). Just as in the
simpler Perry-like scenarios, two cognitive dimensions can be distinguished
in its grasping. First, it has the inferential role of a feature-placing thought.
Second, I am nevertheless not ready to draw all the inferences that would
be licensed by a genuine feature-placing thought. I restrict my reasoning to
selected ways of establishing the thought, and ways of drawing consequences
from it. For instance, as my simulation of Constance is decoupled from
actual perception and action, my current experience of rain, say in Paris, does
not establish the truth of It’s raining, just as the latter does not lead to my
opening an umbrella where I am. In fact, since the situation is stipulated to
be Constance, my reasoning does not have to be sensitive to actual changes
in my spatial relation to Constance, whatever it is.
Within the context of my simulation of Constance, the move from It’s
raining heavily to The streets are slippery makes perfectly good sense given the
inferential role of the premise. As contrasts between Constance and other
cities cannot be drawn within such a simulation, there is no question as
to whether the place where it is raining is the same as the place where
the relevant streets are. In general, it may be cognitively more manageable
to cope with a partial situation rather than with the whole world when
the difference between them is irrelevant to the success of one’s theoretical
and practical projects. For instance, in a Perry-like scenario, the thought
It’s raining can be directly geared to local rain-protecting action because the
success of the latter does not depend on the weather elsewhere in the world.
There is some analogy to be made here with logical reasoning with arbit-
rary objects (cf. Fine 1985). When I reason with an arbitrary object, I have to
make sure that the latter is representative of the domain of quantification.
In other words, I have to control my reasoning so that it does not trade on
special assumptions about the object. I can introduce the universal quanti-
fier only if the difference between the arbitrary object and the other objects
in the domain is irrelevant to the validity of my argument.
Of course, in the absence of a substantial theory of cognitive effort, the
foregoing remarks remain speculative. There is an a priori requirement on the
possibility of situated reasoning such as (1), which is that the cognitive cost
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of monitoring the inferences in (1) should be below that of the corresponding
detached reasoning in (2), which articulates the reference to Constance at
each step of the inferential process. Indeed, if each step of the inferential
process in (1) were directly monitored by a full representation of the relevant
situation, namely Constance, the difference between (1) and (2) would
collapse. The fact that this requirement is met may be difficult to establish
in particular cases, for unlike logical reasoning with arbitrary objects, there
are often no strict rules saying which inferences may be drawn and which
should be inhibited.
In the case of (1), the move from It’s raining heavily to The streets are
slippery, as well as the move from the latter to Everybody has to drive very
carefully, are licensed only if the following dispositional condition is met: if
I were to produce the detached versions of these thoughts, they would be
organised as a piece of reasoning about Constance, as in (2). In other words,
one can make such moves because one is disposed to detach the thoughts in
the same way, i.e., to consider them as being implicitly related to the same
constituent. Perhaps the establishment of such a dispositional connection
requires less cognitive effort than explicit articulation of Constance at each
step in the chain of thoughts.
As a different illustration, consider the last thought in (1), Everybody has
to drive very carefully. Arguably, two dimensions can be distinguished in the
grasping of the quantified concept everybody. On the one hand, this concept
is associated with the usual introduction and elimination rules. It has the
inferential role of an absolute (unrestricted) universal quantifier. On the
other hand, the application of these rules is opportunistically monitored,
which makes everybody an ad hoc concept. The move from Everybody is F to a
is F is made only if a belongs to the paradigm defining the situation, namely
the set of objects that can be identified within it, and the move from a is
F to Everybody is F is made only if a is representative of the objects in this
paradigm. However, it is not clear that such inferential monitoring is more
economical, from a cognitive point of view, than reasoning with a detached
version of the thought, such as the last thought in (2), in which the domain
of quantification is explicitly restricted.
Perhaps there is another way of looking at things. Here is a tentative
suggestion. Suppose that b refers to somebody I take to be outside Constance
at the relevant time. Then the inference from Everybody is F to b is F cannot
be drawn within my simulation of Constance. However, the reason why it
cannot be drawn is not that I have explicitly excluded b from the paradigm
defining the situation. Rather, the inference cannot be drawn because the
thought b is F cannot even be grasped within the simulation. The cognitive
resources deployed within the simulation can at best identify a person as
opposed to others in the paradigmatic set. In other words, modes of presentation
of relevant individuals in the simulation are ad hoc. If one adds to the
simulation the concept of a new person, additional cognitive resources are
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necessary because new contrasts become possible. This might be why it can
be more economical to fix a situation once for a whole simulation project
rather than making it explicit at each step of the inference process.
10.6 Austinian semantics and non-persistent facts
In Recanati’s picture, the claim that there are unarticulated constituents
has a place in a more general framework, inspired by situation semantics,
more precisely the version of situation theory called ‘Austinian semantics’.11
In this framework, any representation concerns, without explicitly repres-
enting, a partial situation. Whenever there is a representation, two semantic
dimensions should be distinguished:
(1) < s  >
In (1),  is a (linguistic or mental) representation, and s is the situation
relative to which  is presented as true or false. Just as It’s raining, in a context
in which it is true or false relative to Paris, does not represent Paris (at least
explicitly),  does not represent the situation s it concerns.
In Austinian semantics, a situation is or generates a set of facts, including
the fact stated by  when it is true. A true representation  is said to be
‘supported’ by the situation it concerns. The support relation, between a situ-
ation and the corresponding representation, is symbolised by the semantic
turnstile:
(2) s = 
Recanati himself gives a more precise, set-theoretic characterization of the
support relation (2000: 69):
Support relation
A situation s supports an atomic fact  with respect to a world w if and
only  belongs to Ws.12
One worry with this characterization is that it seems to carry a commit-
ment to perspectival or non-persistent facts. Consider again the mental
representation It’s raining. It concerns a partial situation which includes facts
about Paris, something that we can represent as follows:
(3) s≥WParis I= It ′s raining
In (3), W is a function that takes as input an object and gives as output
a set of facts about that object. Thus, W(Paris) refers to a set of facts about
Paris, which is included in, or is identical with, the set of facts constituting s.
Now, suppose the representation is true: it is actually raining in Paris. What
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is, then, the fact stated by It’s raining? On Recanati’s characterization, it
appears to be the fact that it is raining. This is a perspectival fact, in the sense
that it holds only within the partial, Parisian situation. This can give rise
to non-persistence phenomena. For instance, that it is raining is a fact in
the Parisian situation, but it may not be a fact in a larger situation, such as
France. The fact that it is raining in Paris is compatible with the fact that
it is not raining in France in general. (I assume that it is raining in a given
situation s only if there is a fair distribution of rain within s.)
Much of what I have said in this chapter seems to me to be independent
of the existence of non-persistent facts. Thus, either there is an alternative
characterization of the support relation which does not carry a commitment
to such facts, or the relation between a situation and its representation is
not one of truth-making. If one follows the first option, one can still give a
set-theoretical characterization of the support relation. Roughly, a situation
s supports  if and only if the fact stated by  (in the relevant context) is
included in s. However, the latter fact is persistent; it is the fact that in s .
For instance, the fact stated by It’s raining, in the relevant context, is the
persistent fact that it is raining in Paris.
However, the second option seems tome to be preferable, whichmakes my
notion of situation different from Recanati’s. On my definition, a situation
includes all the facts that are responsible for the representation’s expressing
an absolute proposition. For instance, the situation of the representation
It’s raining, as used in a particular context to express the proposition that
it is raining in Paris, includes various facts about the relation between the
representation and Paris. What I have suggested in this chapter is that the
facts that make the representation concern Paris are of a different kind from
the facts which make the representation explicitly about rain. The latter
have to do with inferential role, whereas the former concern the subject’s
restricted use of the representation. The situation includes both kinds of
facts. The claim that it contains in addition the fact that it is raining in Paris
if the representation is true does not seem to have much explanatory value.
10.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have followed Recanati’s lead in arguing for the relevance
of the notion of a situated representation. Two points have been particu-
larly stressed. First, the notion of situated representation is intimately linked
with that of ad hoc or temporary concepts. We have the ability to silence
some aspects of the inferential roles of our representations and make explicit
only what is in fact needed in a particular context. We thus create ad hoc
concepts, which we use in representation only with respect to partial situ-
ations. Second, the notion of situation can be dissociated from the concep-
tion of perspectival or non-persistent facts, which Recanati seems to follow
Barwise in endorsing. On the present account, a situation comprises complex
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relational facts between a representation and its propositional constituents,
articulated and unarticulated, but need not in general include the fact stated
by the representation when it is true.
Notes
1. Versions of this chapter were presented at the Summer School of Analytic Philo-
sophy organized by Pascal Engel in July 2002, in Oslo in November 2002, and
in Granada in March 2003. I thank the audiences there, as well as Eros Corazza,
Dick Carter, Steven Davis, Pascal Engel, Elisabeth Pacherie, Stefano Predelli, Joëlle
Proust and François Recanati for helpful comments and discussion.
2. On the difference between unarticulated constituents at the level of language
and unarticulated constituents at the level of thought, see also Corazza (2002),
to which I am indebted in what follows.
3. The notion of concept used here is non-Fregean; it concerns the level of sense, not
the level of reference. ‘Concept’ and ‘mode of presentation’ are used as synonyms.
4. I shall adopt the convention of using italics for descriptions of mental represent-
ations.
5. I shall pretend, for simplicity’s sake, that the temporal parameter is genuinely
articulated in the thought It’s raining, but in fact it need not be. As Kaplan
(1989: 504), puts it, ‘ “It’s raining” seems to be locationally as well as temporally
and modally neutral’. The same is true of the mental representation It’s raining.
6. In Recanati’s (2002a) terminology, the place is ‘weakly’ articulated.
7. This is related to Evans’s (1982) Generality Constraint.
8. By ‘absolute proposition’, I mean a proposition whose truth-value is not relative
to anything but a possible world.
9. Cf. Recanati (1997: 54–5) for the connection between explicit representation and
the possibility of contrasting the referent with others in the relevant paradig-
matic set.
10. This is a variation on Recanati’s example ‘Berkeley is a nice place. There are
bookstores and coffee shops everywhere’ (2000: 67).
11. The original inspiration is John L. Austin’s essay ‘Truth’, reprinted in Austin
(1971). See Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), and Recanati (1997, 2000).
12. Ws is the set of facts associated with s. In what follows, I ignore the relativization
of the support relation to a world.
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Recanati’s Reply to Dokic
I
Do thoughts involve unarticulated constituents? Dokic attempts to weaken
the case for unarticulated constituency in thought, by arguing that the proto-
typical examples invoked by Perry should be reinterpreted. Those examples
‘do not introduce unarticulated constituents because in each case there is
a better interpretation which makes the relevant utterances and thoughts
completely articulated after all, although expressive of a more primitive
ontology’.
Dokic discusses three examples: simultaneity, time-zones, and Z-land. He
points out an alleged difficulty for Perry’s position ormine. Ordinary subjects
do not have inertial frames in their ontology, five-year-olds do not have
time-zones in their ontology, and Z-landers do not have places in their
ontology. According to Dokic, we should straightforwardly acknowledge
the fact that the subject’s ontology is more primitive than ours, instead
of claiming that the subject’s thought involves ‘unarticulated constituents’
which he or she is not even able to articulate. By positing unarticulated
constituents in the subject’s thoughts we – the theorists – unduly force our
own ontology upon them.
Let me mention a fourth example that corresponds to the sort of case
Dokic has in mind. Let us assume a primitive organism that lives in the
present, constantly reacting to what is currently taking place, without ever
thinking about the past or the future. Let the organism think ‘it’s cold’
at time t1, and ‘it’s hot’ (or ‘it’s not cold’) at time t2. Dokic would say,
correctly I believe, that the organism’s ontology contains only objects and
properties, and possibly places, but not times. This is the exact temporal
analogue of the Z-land case. In the light of this example, however, Dokic’s
argument that the subject’s thought in such situations does not involve
unarticulated constituents turns out to be untenable. For we must account
for the organism’s rationality. If we don’t relativize the organism’s thoughts
to times, by construing them as ‘concerning’ particular instants, we cannot
capture the fact that the organism does not contradict himself even though
he thinks ‘it’s cold’ and ‘it’s not cold’. He does not contradict himself because
217
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his thought that it is cold is true iff it is cold at time t1 (when the thought
is tokened), while the thought that it’s not cold is true iff it’s not cold at t2.
The notion of an unarticulated constituent enables us to capture the
truth-conditions of the organism’s thoughts by bringing environmental facts
into play, without imputing to the organism the ability to conceptualise
or mentally articulate those facts. It follows that the primitiveness of one’s
ontology has no bearing on the issue, whether or not one’s thought involves
unarticulated constituents (thus understood). Of course the organism’s onto-
logy does not encompass times; but this does not show that his thoughts do
not concern times.
II
Dokic thinks one should accept unarticulated constituents only when they
make a cognitive difference to the subject. This he calls the ‘Anchoring
Constraint’:
Anchoring Constraint:
A mental representation is not related to the situation it concerns in a
purely external manner but by way of cognitive facts about the subject.1
In the Z-land case Dokic denies that the place is an unarticulated constituent
of the thought because the subject’s relation to the place of thinking is
‘purely external’: the place has no cognitive reality for the subject. The situ-
ation is different for us, since we have a sophisticated ontology and can think
about places. Still, we often do not bother to articulate the place because
the current cognitive task does not require it. In such cases – for example,
when I look out the window, see that it rains, and grab my umbrella – Dokic
accepts that the place is an unarticulated constituent of the thought. For the
place has some cognitive reality for the subject.
At this point, however, the question arises: which cognitive reality? The
fact that the subject is able to think about the place and to conceptualize
it is neither necessary nor sufficient to confer the relevant cognitive reality.
A conceptual ability is not sufficient because it is a mere ability, which may
or may not be exercised; and it is not necessary because it is conceptual. As
Dokic rightly points out, the subject typically bears a cognitive yet noncon-
ceptual relation to the unarticulated place of thinking, in virtue of which
he is able to monitor changes of location so as to inhibit certain inferences
that require locational constancy.
It is interesting to compare Dokic’s position with Perry’s. In ‘Relativized
Propositions’ (Recanati 2006) I ascribed to Perry the view that the situation
a representation concerns must be given in a purely external manner, rather
than through some cognitive discrimination on the part of the subject. Dokic
holds the exact opposite of this view. As far as I am concerned, I hold an
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intermediate position. Against Perry, I insist that, in many cases, the situ-
ation which an utterance or thought concerns will be determined not by
external facts like the location of the speaker, but by cognitive factors such
as the topic of the conversation or what the thinker is mentally focussing
on. In such cases, admittedly, the situation s which the representation R
concerns will itself have to be somehow represented or articulated – it will
have to be cognitively discriminated – but that would raise a problem only if
that entailed that s is articulated in R. As I point out in ‘Relativized Proposi-
tions’, that consequence does not follow. I therefore reject the ‘No Cognitive
Concerning’ principle which Perry seems to accept in his discussion of unar-
ticulated constituents and the concerning relation. But I also reject Dokic’s
‘Anchoring Constraint’, which goes too far in the other direction.
III
There are unarticulated constituents in language and there are unarticulated
constituents in thought. Dokic says that all combinations are possible: a
given constituent may be articulated in language but not in thought, or
in thought but not language, or in both, or in neither. I agree. The only
problematic case is the case in which a constituent is articulated in language
but not in thought. It is problematic because it seems that one cannot
linguistically articulate something without eo ipso thinking about it. But in
‘Relativized Propositions’, I argued that an important category of thoughts,
namely ‘context-relative thoughts’, cannot be literally expressed in language.
To express such a thought sometimes the best thing we can do is to use
an indexical sentence, which articulates what is left unarticulated in the
corresponding context-relative thought. Thus ordinary (non-emphatic) de se
beliefs2 are context-relative: they ‘concern’ the self but are not ‘about’ it. As
Lewis (1979) puts it, the de se believer ‘self-ascribes’ a property: the content
of his belief, therefore, is not a complete proposition with himself as a
constituent. Still the proper way of expressing a de se belief in English
is by using a first-person sentence, in which the word ‘I’ articulates the
unarticulated subject of the self-ascription. We cannot say ‘Hungry!’, we
have to say ‘I am hungry’. In such cases it makes sense to say that the self
that is articulated in language is not articulated in the expressed thought.
Dokic sees that there is an important connection between situatedness
(or unarticulatedness) and ad hoc concepts. He says that the simple concept
RAIN that one uses when one sees rain and thinks ‘it’s raining’ (without artic-
ulating the place) is an ad hoc concept ‘derived from the stable concept RAIN2,
true of times and places, by temporarily silencing our ability to distinguish
one rain event from the another (at a given time)’. But I see no reason not
to proceed in the other direction. Why not start from the simple concept
RAIN and enrich it into the more complex concept RAIN-AT-A-PLACE?
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Finally, there is the problem of nonpersistence. Nonpersistent facts (such
as the fact that it’s raining, or the fact that everybody’s happy) are
perspectival: they hold only relative to a point of view, and may no longer
hold when we change the point of view. Like Perry and many others, Dokic
thinks that facts, being part of objective reality, cannot be perspectival,
hence that one shouldn’t accept nonpersistent facts. He may be right, but
I find this metaphysical issue extraordinarily complex. Reality is, indeed,
objective, but it may be construed as fragmented (Fine (2005: 280–84)). That
is, we do not have to accept the Tractarian idea that there is a world that is
the totality of facts. We can take reality to consist of    situations, without
reality itself being a ‘maximal’ situation (Barwise 1989: 261–2). If we take
this line, the issue of nonpersistent facts appears in a new light. Be that as it
may, the theory of situations (including the bit about nonpersistent facts) is
a tool that I find useful in theorizing about language and thought. Whether
or not it makes sense as a metaphysical framework is an issue I’d like to leave
open for the moment.
Notes
1. See Dokic, ‘Situated Mental Representations’ (ms. Institut jean Nicod).
2. The contrast between ordinary and emphatic de se beliefs comes from Stéphane
Chauvier, Dire ‘Je’: Essai sur la subjectivité. Paris: Vrin, 2001.
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